



Forthcoming in Philosophical Topics
1. Introduction
It is a platitude that when we reason, we often take things for granted, sometimes even
justifiably so. The chemist might reason from the fact that a substance turns litmus paper
red to that substance being an acid. In so doing, they take for granted, reasonably
enough, that this test for acidity is valid. We ordinarily reason from things looking a
certain way to their being that way. We take for granted, reasonably enough, that things
are as they look.1
Although it is a platitude that we often take things for granted when we
reason—whether justifiably or not—one might think that we do not have to. In fact, it is
a natural expectation that were we not pressed by time, lack of energy or focus, we could
always in principle make explicit in the form of premises every single presupposition we
make in the course of our reasoning. In other words, it is natural to expect it to be true
that presuppositionless reasoning is possible:
Presuppositionless: Presuppositionless reasoning is possible.
Presuppositionless is a reassuring thought. It tells us that, at least in ideal circumstances,
we can always inspect our reasoning by making explicit one-by-one the considerations
upon which our conclusion relies.
So it is not surprising that in analytic philosophy, several prominent philosophers
have assumed Presuppositionless. Consider Frege (1967:vi):
It cannot be demanded that everything be proved, because that is impossible. But
we can require that all propositions used without proof be expressly declared as
such, so that we can see distinctly what the whole structure rests upon.
In this passage, Frege endorses the claim that every proposition that in a proof has a
bearing for a conclusion could at least in principle be spelled out as a further premise.
Along similar lines, Grice (2005) argues that every reasoning can be mapped into an
ideal reconstruction that makes explicit every presupposition in it:
Perhaps the most attractive idea is to suppose that we should
consider ourselves faced not just with one argument or piece of
reasoning (Jill’s actual reasoning), but with two, one of which is
1 I’d like to thank Jim Pryor, Jennifer Carr, Jake Quilty-Dunn, Peter Brössel, Insa Lawler, and all the participants of
the Bochum Epistemology Workshop 2019 for helpful discussion on the topics covered in this essay.
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actual (Jill’s reasoning) and the other of which is non-actual or ideal
(a reconstruction of Jill’s argument incorporating as a premiss the
proposition which we are taking her to have had non-explicitly in
mind: the former will be informal, the latter formal (and often
canonical). Jill’s actual argument will be informally valid just in
case there is a legitimate reconstruction of it which is formally valid
and which supplements the informal argument with premises which
are true (as well as being propositions which, in some sense, Jill has
in mind) (Grice 2005:9).
Thus, Presuppositionless is both natural and widely assumed. In this essay, I
argue that it is false: presuppositionless reasoning is impossible. Indeed, I think this is
one of the lessons of a long-standing paradox about inference and reasoning known as
Lewis Carroll’s (1985) regress of the premises. Many philosophers agree that Carroll’s
regress teaches us something foundational about reasoning. I part ways about what it is
that it teaches us. What it teaches us is that Presuppositionless is false—i.e., that the
structure of reasoning is constitutively presuppositional.
Here is the roadmap. I start by raising what I shall call the ‘puzzle of epistemic
assessability’—the puzzle of how reasoning, qua mental process, can be epistemically
assessable (§2). This discussion will motivate an influential view of reasoning (§3)
which notoriously faces the regress challenge (§4). I argue that the prominent responses
to the regress challenge—i.e., the “blind reasoning” response, the “rule-following”
response and the “non-processual reasoning” response—cannot satisfactorily solve the
puzzle of epistemic assessability (§5). Then, I go on to suggest that a satisfactory
response to both the regress challenge and the puzzle of epistemic assessability requires
recognizing the distinction between input bases and structural bases—a distinction which
is independently motivated both by a consideration of the structure of processes in
general (§6) and by a closer look at Lewis Carroll’s original regress challenge (§7); the
resulting view can solve the puzzle of epistemic assessability (§8) and can be defended
against prominent objections (§9). However, it is incompatible with Presuppositionless
(§10). Therefore, I suggest we adopt it and reject Presuppositionless instead.
2. The puzzle of epistemic assessability
Reasoning has the superficial grammar of a process. The use of the progressive
‘reasoning’ in e.g., while reasoning from P to Q, one might realize the falsity of P, is
telling. Indeed, that reasoning is a process is a foundational assumption in the cognitive
sciences (e.g. Johnson-Laird 1983; Johnson-Laird & Khemlani 2013). Theoretical
reflection might convince us that the superficial grammar of reasoning is
misleading—that, in other words, reasoning is not a process and that philosophers of
reasoning are after something quite different from cognitive scientists inquiring over the
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nature of human reasoning. But barring excellent reasons to think so, the presumption
should be that reasoning is a process.2
One remarkable fact about reasoning processes is that they are epistemically
assessable. Indeed, we can distinguish between at least two dimensions of their
epistemic assessability. First, we can assess reasoning for whether or not the premises
support the conclusion (call it Support). Second, we might assess reasoning for whether
the reasoner is on good grounds in drawing the conclusion (call it Grounds). Support and
grounds can come apart. As an illustrative example, consider inferring x^n + y^n is not
equal to z^n from x, y, z, and n are whole numbers and n is greater than 2 (Fermat’s
Theorem, cf. Boghossian 2011: 227). We know from Fermat’s Theorem that the premise
supports the conclusion. But one would not be justified in drawing the conclusion if one
were unaware of the theorem and with no other reasons to think that the conclusion
follows.
What counts as support varies with the kind of reasoning—deductive support (or
entailment) for deductive reasoning, probabilistic support for inductive and abductive
reasoning, and counting in favor of forming an intention for practical reasoning. There
are also different kinds of grounds. Just like one’s belief might be justified and yet fall
short of knowledge, similarly, one’s reaching a conclusion can be epistemically off, even
though justified. For example, consider Alvin, who is told by George that if John drives a
Ford to work, then at least one of Alvin’s colleagues owns a Ford. George intentionally
fed Alvin with what he thought to be false information. So, when the unaware Alvin sees
John drive a Ford, he concludes that somebody in his office drives a Ford. As a matter of
fact, this conditional is true, since John only drives a car if he borrows it from Nevi, who
is also Alvin’s co-worker. And so it is true that if John drives a Ford, then somebody in
Alvin’s office owns a Ford (Gettiered Reasoning). Though the premise supports the









So, reasoning is epistemically assessable and across different dimensions.
Arguably, its epistemic assessability sets it apart from other kinds of mental processes.
Consider an unorganized flow of thoughts that one might undergo just before falling
asleep. This is also a mental process—and in particular, a transition of thoughts—but not
2 Some have denied the causal nature of reasoning (Boyle 2011; Valaris 2014) in the light of the regress challenge. I
will return to this view later in §5.
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one that is epistemically assessable for support or grounds. Or consider the case of a
depressive person whose positive thoughts always tend to cause associative negative
thoughts (Depressive Association, cf. Broome 2013:225). The depressive person is not
epistemically blameworthy for reliably associating good thoughts with bad thoughts. Nor
does it make much sense to ask whether the depressive person is on good or bad
epistemic grounds for making these associations. Thus, not every mental process (or
every transition of thoughts) is epistemically assessable. In virtue of what is reasoning
epistemically assessable?
One tempting answer is that reasoning is not just a mental process. Rather, it is, or
involves, an action—i.e., the action of drawing a conclusion. By contrast, disorganized
flows or associations of thoughts are not actions. However, even granting the assumption
that paradigmatic cases of reasoning are all actions, their being agentive cannot be the
full explanation for why reasoning is epistemically assessable in the way it is. That is so
because not every action is epistemically assessable. For example, it does not make much
sense to ask if I am (epistemically) justified in saying ‘hi’ to a passerby, even though this
utterance is an action. Moreover, even when actions are epistemically assessable, they
are typically (always?) so in virtue of being based on propositional attitudes which are
epistemically assessable. So, for example, one’s assertion that it is raining can be
justified in virtue of being based on a justified belief about the weather. Indeed, a
widespread assumption of the debate about the norms of assertion is that assertions are
epistemically proper only if based on epistemically proper propositional attitudes—e.g.,
knowledge (Williamson 1996) or justified belief (Brown 2010). So, when actions are
epistemically assessable, they are so derivatively, if at all. By contrast, reasoning seems
fundamentally epistemically assessable. The puzzle of epistemic assessability is to
explain in virtue of what reasoning processes are epistemically assessable, and so in
what ways reasoning differs from other mental processes that are not epistemically
assessable.
A final clarification is in order. Saying that reasoning is epistemically assessable
is not saying that every inferential process is epistemically assessable. Rather, it is saying
that paradigmatic cases of inferences are epistemically assessable. A comparison: not
every declarative utterance is epistemically assessable—for example, pretenses and
utterances made in a play are not epistemically assessable. By contrast, paradigmatic
cases of declarative utterances—i.e., assertions—are epistemically assessable. Similarly,
some inferential processes might not be epistemically assessable (I will return to this
issue in §10), even though paradigmatic cases of reasoning are. An ideal solution to the
puzzle of epistemic assessability would explain in virtue of what paradigmatic cases of
reasoning are epistemically assessable, and would do so in a way to cast light on why
mental processes that closely resemble reasoning are not epistemically assessable.
3. Solving the puzzle of epistemic assessability
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Not every view of reasoning as a mental process can vindicate its epistemic assessability.
This point has been very vividly pressed by Longino (1978) in an under-discussed paper
where she first observed that the puzzle of epistemic assessability arises for the ‘simple
causal view’ of reasoning. According to the simple causal view, reasoning from premises
to conclusions is simply a causal process where certain premise-thoughts cause a
conclusion-thought (Armstrong 1968, p. 194). On the usual understanding of causation,
the simple causal view amounts to saying that, if one holds some premise-thoughts, then
one cannot but hold the conclusion-thoughts that are caused by those premise-thoughts.
But then it is obscure in what sense one might be epistemically off in reaching the
conclusion. Thus, the simple causal view makes it utterly mysterious why reasoning is
epistemically assessable in the way we have seen it is.
As Longino (1978) observed, the puzzle can be solved if we think of reasoning as
a process that involves the so-called taking condition (e.g., Boghossian 2011, p. 79).
According to this condition, as usually formulated, a transition from some
premise-beliefs to a conclusion-belief counts as inference only if the thinker takes his
conclusion to be supported by the presumed truth of those other beliefs. While this
standard formulation of the taking condition is rather intuitive, it has the drawback of
narrowly applying only to some cases of reasoning—those transitions from
premise-thoughts to conclusion-thoughts. Of course, however, not every reasoning
process has this ‘premise-conclusion’ structure, as in the case of reasoning by reductio or
by conditional proof (Dogramaci 2016); nor does every reasoning process end with a
thought, since sometimes we reason to an intention or plan, as in the case of practical
reasoning. A more comprehensive formulation of the taking condition is as follows:
Taking condition: A transition of thoughts counts as reasoning only if in it the
reasoner takes certain considerations in support of a certain attitude towards a
conclusion.
The Taking Condition requires the reasoner to take certain considerations in support of
a certain attitude towards a conclusion. The relevant attitude does not need to be one of
belief, as in the case of practical reasoning; even just focusing on theoretical reasoning,
sometimes we reason not to a belief but to the suspension or abandonment of a belief (cf.
Harman 1986, Drucker 2021). In this last sort of case, the Taking Condition requires
that we reason by taking certain considerations to support the suspension or
abandonment of that belief. A second dimension of generality of the Taking condition is
that, while ‘the relevant considerations’ are often premises of one’s reasoning, they do
not need to be. For Taking Condition applies to all forms of reasoning (theoretical as
well as practical, and deductive as well as inductive or abductive) whatever their
structure. When the reasoning has a “Premises, Conclusion” structure, it simply requires
taking the premises to support embracing the conclusion. When the reasoning is, say, by
reductio ad absurdum, it requires taking the fact that a contradiction is derivable from
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certain premises to support the denial of those premises; when the reasoning is, say, by
conditional proof, it requires taking the fact that a certain conclusion follows from certain
premises to support embracing the conditional that if those premises holds then that
conclusion holds. When the reasoning is premise-less, as when we just mentally judge a
tautology to be true, the reasoning also involves some taking—i.e., taking that tautology
to be true by logic (cf. Pavese 2021, section 4.3). And so on. Overall, depending on the
structure of reasoning, the considerations that, according to the Taking Condition, one
ought to take in support of embracing or rejecting a conclusion in order for one to count
as reasoning can be different.
By imposing the Taking Condition, we can develop the simple causal view into
a more complex causal view of reasoning:
Reasoning: S’s reasoning is a process whereby S comes to have an attitude
towards a conclusion C because of S’s taking certain considerations to support
that attitude towards C.
According to Reasoning, reasoning is a mental process that has a conclusion-attitude as
output, and the taking as intermediary; as inputs, it leaves open that one might have
premise-attitudes (as in ‘premise-conclusion’ reasoning) or other pieces of reasoning, as
in reasoning by reductio or by conditional proof. While often premise-attitudes are
beliefs of the reasoner, they do not need to be, as sometimes we reason from credences or
partial beliefs; similarly, while often conclusion-attitudes are beliefs, they do not need to
be, since sometimes we reason to an intention of the reasoner and in other cases, we
reason to the suspension or the abandonment of a belief.
Reasoning affords a simple and clear answer to the question of why reasoning is
epistemically assessable in the way it is. The taking is, after all, a propositional attitude
and proposition attitudes are the sort of things that can be assessed for grounds: e.g., I
might be unjustified in taking the premises to support the conclusions and I might be
irrational in doing so; moreover, the taking is a propositional attitude that can be true or
false. So if reasoning involves the taking, we would expect it to be epistemically assessed
for support as well. Thus, Reasoning affords an explanation of the epistemic
assessability of reasoning in terms of the epistemic assessability of the taking.
While Reasoning provides an excellent response to the puzzle of epistemic
assessability, it faces the problem of deviant causal chains. Consider Neta’s (2013:390)
example of Roderick, who on his deathbed thinks back on his otherwise worthless life
and finds comfort in the thought that he had at least solved the Gettier problem. But then
Tim bursts into his room and proves to Roderick that his solution to the Gettier problem
is unsuccessful. Believing that his solution to the Gettier problem is unsuccessful, and
also that therefore that his life was worthless, Roderick falls into a state of despair and,
out of despair, believes that his life was worthless. In this case, Reasoning incorrectly
predicts that Roderick has reached his conclusion by reasoning.
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The problem arises because, according to Reasoning, the relation between the
taking condition and reaching a conclusion is causal. In order to overcome this problem,
one might instead characterize that relation in terms of grounding. Accordingly, Roderick
is not reasoning in the example above, as he does not reach the conclusion that his life
was worthless in virtue of taking the premise (that he did not solve the Gettier problem)
to support that conclusion. This discussion motivates the following amendment:
Reasoning grounded: S’s reasoning is a process whereby S forms an attitude
towards C in virtue of S’s taking certain considerations to support that attitude towards C.
4. From the pot to the frying pan
Reasoning grounded overcomes the problem of deviant causal chains. Yet, it faces the
regress challenge (cf. Fumerton 1995; Boghossian 2014, 2016, 2019; Hlobil 2014;
Chudnoff 2013; Wright 2014; Broome 2014; Siegel 2016). To illustrate the challenge,
consider for simplicity categorically reasoning from P1, …, Pn to a conclusion C, in
accordance with Reasoning grounded. By an application of the Taking condition to
this case of categorical reasoning, we get:
(Premise 1: Taking Condition): Reasoning from premises P1, …, Pn to a
conclusion C requires taking P1, …, Pn to support believing C.
Moreover, Reasoning grounded applied to this particular case gives us the second
premise:
(Premise 2: Reasoning as a process): Reasoning from P1, …, Pn to C in virtue of
taking P1, …, Pn to support believing C is a matter of undergoing a process that has the
reasoner’s beliefs in P1, …, Pn as inputs, the taking as intermediary, and the reasoner’s
belief in C as output.
But taking P1, …, Pn to support believing C plausibly is or involves a doxastic attitude:
(Premise 3: Doxastic Construal of the Taking) Taking that P1, …, Pn support
believing C is a doxastic attitude (a belief, or a credence, or a partial belief).
Finally, it seems natural to assume that the taking is playing a similar role in reasoning to
that of an attitude towards a premise:
(Premise 4: Taking as a Premise) Reasoning to C from P1, …, Pn in virtue of taking
that P1, …, Pn support believing C is a matter of reasoning to C from the reasoner’s
attitudes towards P1, …, Pn and a further doxastic attitude towards the premise (Pn+1)
that P1, ..., Pn support believing C.
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But according to Reasoning grounded, reasoning to C from P1, …, Pn and from the
further premise (Pn+1) that P1, ..., Pn support C amounts to reasoning from one’s
attitudes towards P1, …, Pn and from Pn+1 to one’s attitude towards C by taking it that
P1, …, Pn and Pn+1 support believing C. But is not the taking also a doxastic attitude?
And if so, isn’t that a further premise-attitude? From Premise 1-Premise 4, an infinite
regress ensues.
Henceforth, I will refer to this regress as to the “structural regress of the
premises,” as it arises from considerations having to do with the structure of reasoning.
The structural regress differs from the epistemic regress—or the regress of justification.
The latter arises when you ask what justifies one in taking that the premises support the
conclusion and is triggered by requiring that the justification of the taking be inferential.
While the epistemic regress can be stopped by allowing for non-inferentially justified
takings (cf. Audi 1986; Dogramaci 2010), that by itself does nothing to stop the
structural regress.
The main extant solutions to the regress challenge consist in rejecting either
Premise 1, or Premise 2, or Premise 3. In the next section, I argue that these solutions
cannot also satisfactorily address the puzzle of epistemic assessability. This discussion
will make room in §6 for developing a different kind of solution, one that rejects Premise
4.
5. Extant solutions to the structural regress
5.1 Rejecting Premise 1: Blind reasoners
Rejecting Premise 1 amounts to taking reasoning to be blind, in the sense that it does not
require the reasoner to take the premises to support the conclusion (cf. Wright 2014;
Dogramaci 2016; Rosa 2017). As it stands, this move simply sends us back to square
one: having gotten rid of the taking, how do we explain the distinctive epistemic
assessability of reasoning? Blind reasoning seems to simply forfeit the main theoretical
advantage that a taking condition on reasoning affords.
A view of reasoning that dispenses with the taking but that might nonetheless
seem to vindicate the idea that reasoning is epistemically assessable has been proposed
by McHugh and Way (2018). They propose that reasoning is a functional kind aiming at
fitting attitudes. This view seems to account for the epistemic assessability of reasoning
in terms of whether or not reasoning is performing its function. If reasoning aims at
epistemically fitting attitudes, then it must count as epistemically defective when that
aim is not reached. This approach to the puzzle of epistemic assessability falls under the
general approach of trying to explain the normativity of mental states, processes, or
representations in terms of their (selected) functions (e.g., Millikan 1989, Velleman 2015,
Neander 2017).
However, at a closer scrutiny, this solution to the puzzle of epistemic assessability
falls short of being fully satisfactory. For one would want to know what it is about
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reasoning that makes it amenable to serve its function. To sharpen this point, consider an
analogy: it is a datapoint that beliefs are assessable for truth or falsity, whereas other
mental states, such as intentions or desires, are not. Surely, part of the explanation for
why beliefs are assessable, and intentions or desires are not, is that the former
constitutively aim at certain norms (truth or knowledge), whereas the latter do not aim at
those norms. So far, so good. While this goes some way towards answering the puzzle of
epistemic assessability for beliefs, it falls short of solving it. For one might wonder in
virtue of what beliefs can aim at truth or knowledge. The full answer might include that
beliefs can aim at truth or knowledge because they are the sort of mental states whose
content can be true or known; by contrast, other mental states, such as desires, do not aim
at truth because they are not the sort of states whose content can be true or known.
Analogously, a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of epistemic assessability
would cast light on what it is about the nature of reasoning that makes it suitable for it to
aim at epistemically fitting attitudes and so to be selected to perform such function. This
story will presumably say something about the structure of reasoning that distinguishes it
from other transitions of thoughts (such as associations) that instead are not amenable to
perform the same epistemic function. Just saying that reasoning aims at fitting attitudes,
whereas associations do not, without saying in virtue of what reasoning transitions are fit
to perform that function, goes only some way towards solving the puzzle of epistemic
assessability for reasoning. It does not go all the way.
5.2. Rejecting Premise 2: Non-Processual Reasoners
Another response to the regress is to reject Premise 2—the assumption that reasoning is a
process of sort (cf. Boyle 2011; Valaris 2014). Perhaps, when we reason, we do not
undergo a process. Rather, reasoning from P1, …, Pn to C might simply be a matter of
believing C in virtue of believing that P1, …, Pn support believing C; and one might
satisfy this condition without undergoing any process at all. This ‘non-processual view of
reasoning’ vindicates the epistemic assessability of reasoning, since it encompasses the
taking condition and so it accounts for the epistemic assessability of reasoning in terms
of the epistemic assessability of the taking; at the same time it dissolves the regress
challenge by rejecting the crucial assumption that reasoning is a process.
Now, there is indeed a sense of reasoning—or inferring—that is not processual.
As White (1971: 291) observes: “To infer is neither to journey towards, nor to arrive at or
be in a certain position; ... Inference is not the passage from A to B, but the taking of B as
a result of reflection on A.” On the other hand, as Rumfitt (2011:339) points out, we
sometimes engage in the task of tracing out the implications of some premises. When we
do so, we do it step by step, “taking special care to move only to conclusions that the
premisses really imply.” We might call this process deduction, rather than inference.
Unlike inferences, deductions take time. Unlike inferences, the grammar of deductions
(just like the superficial grammar of reasoning) is that of a process. Although Lewis
Carroll’s (1895) problem might not arise for reasoning understood as inference, it still
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arises for reasoning understood as deduction. In the case of deduction, the suggestion of
blocking the regress by rejecting Premise 2 does not apply, since deduction is a process.
So when it comes to deduction, the proponents of the non-processual view of reasoning
cannot at once address the regress challenge and the puzzle of epistemic assessability.
5.3 Rejecting Premise 3: Rule-followers
The final prominent option is to give up Premise 3—the claim that the taking is a
propositional attitude. Proponents of this response suggest we retain the taking condition
but we do not think of it as a propositional attitude. A prominent alternative proposal is
to understand the taking in dispositional terms (Broome 2013; Boghossian 2014). On yet
another common proposal, the taking is a representational but not a propositional
attitude, for its content is not a proposition but a rule.3
The problem with either proposal is that they risk removing the main advantage of
having the taking condition in place—i.e., the solution of the puzzle of epistemic
assessability. Start with the dispositional view. Not every disposition is epistemically
assessable (consider e.g. dispositions associated with character traits, such as generosity
or short temper). So why expect the taking, understood as a disposition, to be
epistemically assessable? One might object that the taking is a special sort of
disposition—i.e., that of following a rule—and that this disposition is of a kind that we
can epistemically assess. However, this will not work either, since associative processes
also can manifest rule-following dispositions. Consider Depressive Association: it
happens in accordance with the rule HAPPY THOUGHT→UNHAPPY THOUGHT.
Hence, it manifests a disposition to follow a rule but, as we have seen, is not
epistemically assessable in the way reasoning processes are. One might reply that it is4
the manifestation of the rule-following disposition, not the disposition itself, to be
epistemically assessable. If anything, however, its being the disposition’s manifestation
makes the problem only harder, since, as Kripke (1982) taught us, dispositions to follow
rules of this sort are not the sort of things that could justify you in acting in the way you
are disposed to act (cf. also Wittgenstein 1968: remark 258).
In this respect, the alternative representational non-propositional construal of the
taking does not fare any better. On this construal, the taking is representational but not
propositional, which is furthermore not grounded on any more fundamental propositional
state. Since its content is not propositional, the taking is not the sort of thing that can be
epistemically assessed for truth (Support), knowledge and justification (Grounds); nor
can it be derivatively epistemically assessable (in virtue of being grounded on other
4 Could one respond that the rules relevant to reasoning ought to be rules of inferences? This answer presupposes
that we already know what reasoning and inferences are, which is what we are trying to explain.
3 Gupta (2006) seems to endorse this sort of view of rule-following. See also Chudnoff (2014: 24-31), who proposes
that the taking should be modeled as a mental imperative. One objection is that thinking of the taking along the lines
of an imperative also faces the puzzle of epistemic assessability, since imperatives are not epistemically assessable
for grounds and support.
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propositional attitudes that are fundamentally epistemically assessable) because by
assumption it is not grounded on any other propositional attitude. So, just like the
dispositional construal, the non-propositional construal of the taking simply forgos the
main advantage of imposing the taking—that of solving the puzzle of epistemic
assessability.
6. Moving forward: premise bases versus structural bases
Thus far, I have argued that the main responses to the structural regress challenge are not
equipped to solve the puzzle of epistemic assessability. No reason for despair: one more
premise needs to be granted for the regress to start—i.e., Premise 4. Premise 4 assumes
that the taking plays the same role that premise-attitudes play in reasoning. But could the
taking be part of reasoning without being an extra (implicit or explicit) premise-attitude?
This turns on what it means for an attitude to be part of reasoning. A plausible
way of understanding it is that, for it to be part of reasoning, the taking ought to figure
among the “bases” for reaching the conclusion—the general idea being that something
gets to be part of reasoning only if it can figure among the considerations on the basis of
which the conclusion is reached. If so, then the question of whether the taking can be
part of reasoning without being an extra premise-attitude boils down to the question of
whether the taking can be among the bases for reaching the conclusion without being an
extra premise-attitude. Can bases not be premise-attitudes?5
In order to see that bases in reasoning need not be premise-attitudes, it is helpful
to compare reasoning to other kinds of processes. Consider a simple ball dispenser
mechanism and the process that consists in dispensing a ball. The input of the process is
the insertion of the ball, and the output of the process is the dispenser dispensing the ball
in a certain location and with a certain speed.
Figure 1: A Ball Dispenser
5 On the notion of basis, cf. Neta (2019).
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When it comes to explaining the dispenser dispensing a ball with a certain speed and at a
certain location, we can distinguish between two kinds of ‘bases’. On one hand, there is
the input to the process (i.e., a ball being fed at the top of the dispenser). On the other
hand, the reason why the ball is dispensed with a certain speed and in a certain location
has also to do with the structure of the dispenser (its angle, its material, its inclination).
The structural features of the dispenser enter essentially in an explanation of the output
of the process. Call these structural features ‘structural bases’ for the output.
Here is another example. Consider the following process, which takes as inputs
full spins of the left wheel (representing certain numbers) and as outputs those of the
second wheel (representing numbers that result from multiplying the input by a constant
number). For example, let us suppose the process takes full spins as input (say 4 spins)
and multiplies it by 2, resulting in 8 full spins.
Figure 2: A Constant Multiplier
While the input is a basis for the output (the number of output full spins), the output is
determined also by the structure of the constant multiplier (by its being a constant
multiplier by 2). Here, the input number of full spins is the input basis for the output, the
structure of the multiplier is a structural basis for the output.
Kinds of bases Constant
multiplying
Action Reasoning
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This distinction between input bases and structural bases also holds for processes
that are actions. To see this, consider the act of accompanying a ball towards a certain
position and at a certain speed. This act has certain inputs (which include, plausibly, an
intention, as well as the knowledge of how to do it), an output (the outcome brought
about by the action) as well as certain structural features. Different action theorists have
different views about what the structural features of an action are but just to mention one,
according to some, they include one’s practical knowledge of what one is doing
(Anscombe 1957).
Reasoning is also a process of sorts. So the distinction between input bases and
structural bases applies to it as well. Among its input bases, there are the reasoner’s
attitudes towards the premises of the reasoning or the reasoner’s having reasoned to some
preliminary conclusion from certain premises. In addition, just like any process,
reasoning has structural bases: facts about its structure that are bases for the reasoner’s
reaching a certain conclusion. The claim that the taking can be part of reasoning without
being a premise-attitude is the claim that the taking can be among the structural bases of
reasoning.
Accordingly, we might distinguish between two notions of bases in
reasoning—input bases and structural bases. Not all reasons need to be input bases for
a conclusion. So, not all bases need to be premise-attitudes. Thus, there is no
contradiction in the taking being among the bases for the conclusion without it being a
premise-attitude, provided that we understand the taking as a structural basis. Hence,
there is room for rejecting Premise 4.
So far so good. But why think that the taking does in fact play such a different
role in reasoning from that of premise-attitudes? There are independent reasons for
thinking that the taking can be a structural basis in reasoning. In order to make progress
on this question, I suggest we look at the original version of Lewis Carroll’s (1895)
regress of the premises, which arises in the context of arguments rather than reasoning.
7. Lewis Carroll’s regress and the presuppositional structure of arguments.
Lewis Carroll’s (1895) original version of the regress arises in the course of an argument
between Achilles and the Tortoise that has the following structure. Suppose 𝛗 and if 𝛗
then 𝛙. From that, Achilles would really want to infer 𝛙. The Tortoise would not allow
it: 𝛙 is inferable—she objects—only if if 𝛗 and if 𝛗 then 𝛙 then 𝛙. Then, Achilles is led
to suppose, in addition, that if 𝛗 and if 𝛗 then 𝛙 then 𝛙. From that together with the
earlier premises, Achilles would want to infer 𝛙. The Tortoise would not allow it: 𝛙 is
inferable—she objects—only if if 𝛗 and if 𝛗 then 𝛙 then 𝛙. No provision of further
premises will convince the Tortoise to accept the conclusion. An infinite regress ensues.
When discussing this version of the regress, philosophers tend to agree that the
Tortoise is behaving irrationally in not accepting the conclusion. And yet somehow she is
in position to trigger the regress. An analysis of Lewis Carroll’s paradox should explain
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what it is about Achilles’ argument that enables the Tortoise to trigger the regress. In
Pavese (2021), I have argued for a diagnosis of Lewis Carroll’s regress that can explain
what it is about Achilles’ argument that enables the Tortoise to trigger the regress. My
diagnosis relies on recognizing that arguments have a presuppositional structure. I have
argued for this point by showing that argument connectives such as ‘therefore’ in an
argument such as (Argument) work as presupposition triggers:
(Argument) Mary is English.  Therefore, she is brave.
(Target Content) Mary’s being brave follows from Mary’s being English.
In particular, in e.g. (Argument), ‘therefore’ triggers the presupposition that
Mary’s being brave follows from her being English, expressed by (Target Content).
Evidence for this claim is that ‘therefore’ satisfies the usual linguistic tests for
presupposition triggers (Pavese 2017; 2021, Kocurek and Pavese 2021, Pavese 2022):
projection, not-at-issuedness, resistance to embedding under logical operators (cf. Beaver
2001).
This observation has important consequences for how to understand the speech
act of making an argument. For it suggests that this speech act will involve not just
asserting (or supposing) the premises and drawing the conclusion; it also will involve the
argument giver’s presupposing certain entailment relations to hold between the premises
and the conclusions. More precisely, one’s act of concluding 𝛙 from 𝛟 will typically
presuppose one’s taking 𝛟 to support embracing 𝛙. Thus, the structure of the speech act
of giving an argument of this form includes, beyond supposing (or asserting) its premises
and drawing its conclusion, the presupposition that one is taking the premises to support
the conclusion.
This presupposition is not the same as a background premise. Background
premises are among the premises that ‘therefore’ takes as input. These inputs to
‘therefore’ are not the same as the presuppositions of the act of giving an argument. The
presupposition that one is taking e.g., the premises to support believing the conclusion is
a structural presupposition in that it is constitutive of the structure of the speech act. It is
part of the structure of giving an argument without being a (backgrounded or explicit)
premise.
Parts of an argument Characterization
Premise-attitudes inputs to ‘therefore’
Background premise-attitudes implicit inputs to ‘therefore’
Structural presupposition triggered by ‘therefore’
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Thinking of the speech act of giving an argument as presupposing the argument
giver’s taking the premises to support the conclusion suggests the following analysis of
the dynamics between Achilles and the Tortoise. The regress arises because at each turn
the Tortoise challenges Achilles’ presupposing that the conclusion is supported by the
premises. By doing so, the structural presupposition is turned into a new premise. But as
a new premise is added, arguing to the conclusion from the new set of premises requires
a new structural presupposition. The Tortoise challenges it again and so turns it into a
premise. Adding that premise alters again the structure of the argument and triggers a
new structural presupposition. And so on.
This diagnosis of the regress satisfies the desideratum laid out at the outset: the
Tortoise is in position to trigger the regress because something is presupposed by
Achilles’s argument and thus can in turn be challenged by the Tortoise. It also explains
why the Tortoise’s behavior is uncooperative. It is generally uncooperative to challenge
what is presupposed by a speaker if it is something that is known by the participants of
the conversation or that it is reasonable for the speaker to expect them to know. But that
an instance of modus ponens is true is platitudinous and commonly known by competent
speakers of English. That is why at each turn it is uncooperative for the Tortoise to6
challenge it.7
8. Reasoning and Regress
The distinction between premises and structural presuppositions provides a diagnosis of
the original version of Lewis Carroll’s regress, which arises in the context of an argument
between Achilles and the Tortoise. Now, the topic of this essay is reasoning, not
arguments. Reasoning is not a speech act, though plausibly it is a mental act of sorts (cf.
Wu manuscript). Moreover, it is natural to take the structure of arguments to reflect the
structure of reasoning. For one thing, arguments can express our reasoning. And
reasoning can be done through arguments, as when mathematicians prove theorems in
the public language of mathematics. For that to be possible, the structure of arguments
must mirror the structure of reasoning. Moreover, the fact that Carroll’s regress arises
both in the context of arguments and in the context of reasoning is further evidence that
arguments and reasoning are structurally alike. Hence, we should expect the solution to
the two versions of the regress to be unified.
7En passant, let me note that this diagnosis of Lewis Carroll’s regress provides a natural explanation of Hlobil’s
(2014: 421) observation that (IMA) sounds Moorean paradoxical in terms of the general observation that
presuppositions cannot be canceled if unembedded (cf. Beaver 2001), as evidenced by the weirdness of (X):
(IMA) P; therefore, C. But the inference from P to C is not a good inference (in my context).
(X) It is the doctor who stole the tarts. But nobody did.
6Of course, one might further ask how it is that competent speakers can know that an instance of Modus Ponens is
valid. People have defended different answers to this issue (Wright 2001, 2004; Boghossian 2000, 2001, 2003;
Dummett 1973, Goldman 1986; Dogramaci 2010). By and large, however, they grant that competent speakers of
English can, as a matter of fact, know these sorts of truths.
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Thus, if the structure of the speech act of giving an argument includes the
structural presupposition that the premises support the conclusion, then it is plausible that
the mental act of reasoning too shares this presuppositional structure. This motivates the
thought that the taking may play a role in reasoning akin to that played by structural
presuppositions in arguments. Just like structural presuppositions in arguments, the
taking is not simply a premise-attitude, nor a backgrounded premise-attitude. For
premise-attitudes and backgrounded premise-attitudes are inputs to the act of reasoning,
rather than structural features of the mental act of reasoning. Presuppositions in
reasoning are structural in that they are part of reasoning by being part of its structure
rather than being one of its (explicit or implicit) premise-attitudes.
According to this picture, the conclusion of a reasoning is based on both the
premise-attitudes and the taking. Recall the distinction between input bases and structural
bases (§6). While reaching a conclusion is based on the premise-attitudes, it is also
structurally based on the taking condition. The taking condition is a structural basis in
reasoning. Just like structural bases can figure essentially in explanations of outputs of
processes, similarly the taking can figure essentially in an explanation of how one has
reached a certain conclusion without being an input basis.
Parts of Arguments Parts of Reasoning Functional role












This observation provides us with a way of resisting the regress challenge. Recall
Premise 4, according to which reasoning to C from P1, …, Pn in virtue of taking it that
P1, …, Pn support believing C (= REASONING1) is a matter of reasoning to C from the
reasoner’s attitudes towards P1, …, Pn and a further doxastic attitude towards the
premise (Pn+1) that P1, ..., Pn support believing C (= REASONING2). However, if the
presuppositional view of reasoning is correct, the structure of these two pieces of
reasoning is different in that the latter requires a further taking (that P1, ..., Pn and T
support C). So, REASONING1 cannot amount to the same as REASONING2. Having
shown Premise 4 to be false, we stop the argument leading to the regress.
One might object that this is too quick. Granted, if the taking plays a role in
reasoning similar to that played by structural presuppositions in arguments, then the
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regress of the premises cannot arise for it. But this still leaves open the possibility that a
different sort of regress—a regress of structural presuppositions—could arise. As I argue
in Pavese (2021), the regress of structural presuppositions is, however, not possible. In
order to see this, let us reflect on the nature of presuppositions. Presuppositions differ
from premises in that they cannot be directly challenged nor can they be directly picked
up by demonstratives and resist embedding under logical operators (cf. Stalnaker 1973,
Beaver 2001). As such, it is insulated from embedding under logical operators and so
also from being picked up by the taking operator. This renders them “impermeable” to a
further application of the taking condition. Hence, neither the regress of the premises nor
a regress of presuppositions can start if the taking stays presupposed. It will start if one
keeps challenging it but only because challenging it “un-presupposes” it—i.e., it turns it
into a new premise. The current proposal is that the taking can be presupposed by the
structure of reasoning just as structural presuppositions are in the structure of arguments.
Hence, because of the structural parallel between arguments and reasoning, the same
response against the possibility of a regress of presuppositions applies.
The upshot is the presuppositional view of reasoning. While the presuppositional
view of reasoning endorses a taking condition on reasoning, it construes the taking as a
structural basis rather than an input basis of reasoning. Specifically, it is a structural basis
by being a structural presupposition of the mental act of reasoning. By rejecting Premise
4, the presuppositional view of reasoning can endorse Reasoning Grounded without
facing the regress challenge. The view is motivated by a unified solution to Lewis
Carroll’s regress for arguments and reasoning—a solution that is in turn independently
supported by the semantics of arguments.
Others have pointed out that the regress can be stopped if the taking is implicit
rather than explicit (cf. Besson 2012, Broome 2013, Boghossian 2019). However, by
‘implicit’, these scholars tend to mean ‘tacit’ or ‘unconscious’. The problem with this
way of understanding the taking is that one might consciously take the premises to
support the conclusion while reasoning without regress. For example, I might reason to
Q from accepting P and if P then Q in virtue of explicitly (consciously, reflectively, etc.)
taking that P and if P then Q support accepting Q, as when I attentively follow up the
consequences of my beliefs. If this is correct, it cannot be the taking’s being conscious
that triggers the regress. This is predicted on the present view, since structural
presuppositions themselves do not need to be tacit or unconscious (although they can be).
For example, speakers may be fully aware about what they are presupposing when
speaking or when giving an argument. Indeed, the presuppositional view is compatible
both with the taking being conscious, in the case of active, intentional, and conscious
reasoning; and with it being implicit or unconscious, in the case of unconscious and
unintentional reasoning.
By assigning the taking a structural role to play in reasoning, the presuppositional
view can demarcate reasoning from causal transitions that are not reasoning, such as
Depressive Association. These causal transitions do not count as reasoning because they
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do not involve the taking condition—i.e., do not take the input state to support the output
state. The presuppositional view of reasoning fares better than its competitors—i.e., the
rule-following view of reasoning, the blind view of reasoning, and the non-processual
theory of reasoning—because it affords an explanation of the epistemic assessability of
reasoning: presuppositions are propositional attitudes that can be true and justified or
unjustified. Hence, for example, the view correctly predicts that in Fermat’s Theorem,
the reasoners might not be justified in reaching their conclusion, because they are not
justified in taking the premises to support believing it. It also accounts for justified but
non-knowledgeable reasoning (cf. Gettiered Reasoning), since presuppositions can be
justified but not known.
9 Too demanding?
One prominent objection to any view of reasoning that involves the taking condition is
that it is too demanding. Under this general worry, we might distinguish two different
challenges. The first is the over intellectualization challenge: if taking is part of
reasoning, and the taking is a propositional attitude, does not one need to grasp the
demanding concepts of e.g., support in order to reason? The second challenge is that a
doxastic construal of the taking seems too demanding for particular kinds of
reasoning—such as reasoning under uncertainty—where the taking, if present at all,
seems to fall short of a doxastic attitude.
The presuppositional view of reasoning affords a response to both of these
outstanding challenges. Start with the first. By capitalizing on the distinction between
premise-attitudes and structural presuppositions in reasoning, the proponent of the
presuppositional view has at its disposal novel resources to fend off the over
intellectualization challenge. That is so because presuppositions are sui generis
propositional attitudes. They are doxastic in that they are akin to beliefs in being
epistemically assessable. Following Lewis (1972), we can think of presuppositions as
kinds of beliefs ‘in sensu diviso’. More precisely, one believes in sensu diviso that p, if
one stands in a relation to the proposition that p, understood coarse-grainedly as the set
of possible worlds where p is true. But crucially, one might stand in this relation to p
even without possessing the concepts that we as the theorists use to describe p’s truth
conditions. If the taking is a presupposition and presuppositions are kinds of beliefs in
sensu diviso, then the taking condition can be satisfied even by less conceptually
sophisticated reasoners.
One might nonetheless worry that requiring that whenever one reasons, one ought
to possess a doxastic attitude like the taking is unreasonably demanding. Consider
engaging in an inference simply for the sake of exploring what follows from what. This
process does not need to be epistemically assessable, as it does not need to come with the
sort of commitment that characterizes doxastic attitudes. For another example, consider a
particular case of reasoning under uncertainty, where one successively goes from certain
premises to certain conclusions but in such a way that one’s degree of confidence in the
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premises supporting the conclusion decreases at each turn. After a sufficiently high
number of iterations, one’s degree of belief will be so small as to be unrecognizable as
full belief. And after an infinite number of iterations, it will approximate zero. In this sort
of reasoning, it does not seem plausible that one holds any doxastic attitude towards the
premises supporting the conclusion.8
The response to this objection is that the taking should not always be understood
as doxastic. In full generality, it is best understood along the lines of Stalnaker notion of
acceptance (Stalnaker 2002, p. 715ff). An acceptance is a matter of treating a proposition
as true for certain purposes—i.e., for the purpose of conversation or for the purpose of
exploring consequences of what we already believe or accept. Acceptance is a broader
class of propositional attitudes that includes but is not exhausted by doxastic attitudes
such as beliefs or credences. Suppose the taking is acceptance-like. Then this explains
why certain cases of inferences, such as explorative inferences (§2) and certain cases of
reasoning under uncertainty, are not epistemically assessable—i.e., because the taking in
these cases, though present, is a matter of accepting certain support relations for the
purpose of exploring certain consequences, rather than for their presumed truth. Once
acceptances are counted among the attitudes that can be part of reasoning, we have the
resources for a full solution to the puzzle of epistemic assessability as stated in §2:
paradigmatic cases of reasoning are epistemically assessable in so far as their taking is
doxastic and so can be epistemic assessable; that does not amount to every inferential
process being epistemically assessable, since not every inferential process necessarily
involves a doxastic taking. In particular, an inferential process will be not epistemically
assessable if its taking is an acceptance that is not a belief.
10. Conclusion: Presuppositionless is false
How are we to understand reasoning in such a way to vindicate its distinctive epistemic
assessability? I labeled this the puzzle of epistemic assessability. I believe that the chief
motivation for imposing a taking condition on reasoning is that it provides a nice solution
to this puzzle. However, the structural regress raises a prima facie outstanding challenge
for any view of reasoning that involves the taking condition. The most common
responses to the regress challenge—i.e., the blind reasoning response, the rule-following
response, and the non-processual reasoning response—are not equipped to provide a
satisfactory solution to the puzzle of epistemic assessability. My proposed response is
that the taking condition plays the role of a structural presupposition in the mental act of
reasoning. The resulting presuppositional view is independently motivated by the need of
providing a unified solution to the argument-version and to the reasoning-version of
Lewis Carroll’s regress and by a more general distinction for processes between input
bases and structural bases. I argued that the presuppositional view can overcome the
regress while retaining all the advantages of Reasoning Grounded.
8 I thank Jennifer Carr for raising this challenge to me.
A speaker presupposes that P at a given moment in a conversation just in case he is disposed to act, in his
linguistic behavior, as if he takes the truth of P for granted, and as if he assumes that his 19
20
We are now in a position to draw the main conclusion of my argument. Recall
Presuppositionless—the claim that presuppositionless reasoning is possible. If the
presuppositional view is correct, however, Presuppositionless must be false. For
suppose one makes the presupposition in REASONING 1 into a new premise. That will
have the effect of altering the structure of REASONING 1. A new piece of
reasoning—REASONING 2—comes about, with one more premise-attitude and a new
presuppositional structure. Now suppose I make the presupposition in REASONING 2
into a new premise-attitude. A new piece of reasoning—REASONING 3—comes about,
with one more premise and a new presuppositional structure. And so on.
This dynamic is well-illustrated by the exchange between the Tortoise and
Achilles. What it shows is that the task of turning structural presuppositions into
premises is doomed to be endless, since at each turn, doing so will alter but will not
nullify the presuppositional structure of reasoning. So at each turn, the result will be a
new piece of reasoning, with a new presuppositional structure. If so, then, Lewis
Carroll’s regress does teach us something foundational about the nature of reasoning. But
what it teaches us is neither that we are blind reasoners, nor that we are constitutively
rule-followers, nor that we are non-processual reasoners. Rather, it teaches us that as
reasoners, we constitutively take things for granted: reasoning (theoretical, practical,
deductive, or inductive) is possible only against a set of presuppositions.
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